Consequences

Although we’ve observed two legislators who are Exceptions to the trend of state legislative elections being decided upon nationalized and polarized lines, the process is still accelerating quickly across the states. Thus, it is no wonder that such a rapid rise can have immense consequences for good government.

Hopkins argues that the nationalization of our politics has “the potential to dampen the electoral connection between voters and officials” and “foster polarization and gridlock in federal policy making.”¹ At the state legislative level, this is no different.

With many voters unable or unwilling to pay attention to state politics, they can unknowingly approve with their nationalized vote an influx of legislators that is overly partisan, incompetent, or both – with little room for recourse. This can lead to some intriguing results.

In terms of fascinating electoral outcomes, one consequence of the nationalization of state legislatures is the unique quasi-three-party system that has cropped up in Kansas recently: conservative Republicans, moderate Republicans, and moderate Democrats, with any two factions teaming up to overwhelm the third.² However, even that opportunity for cross-partisan efforts in Kansas has dwindled recently: in 2018, 4 moderate Republicans in Clinton-won districts announced they were becoming Democrats.³ And then in 2020, many of the remaining moderate Republicans were successfully primaried by conservative challengers.²

This “three-party” system can be seen as an informal way to control for the consequences of polarization at the state legislative level. Another possible approach would be a formal, institutional stopgap, such as the establishment of a nonpartisan body, like the unicameral Nebraska Legislature.

This approach worked for a while, with the official nonpartisan nature of the body serving to tamp down partisan influence and promote good government. However, as one might expect, the legislature has “polarized rapidly within the past decade,” with “parties overcoming institutions designed to eliminate them.”⁴ Thus, another consequence of the nationalization of state legislative elections has been to introduce partisan gridlock into systems intended to flush out such happenings.

A third consequence of the phenomenon is the increasing role of state legislatures in national issues, particularly electing federal lawmakers. A partisan state legislature can gerrymander House seats for their party. They can change the rules for Senate elections to give their preferred candidate an advantage. And as we’ve seen in the 2020 election, some can even try to award their electoral votes to their party of choice, even if it goes against the will of the voters in their states.⁵

Ordinarily, a strong state legislature might serve as a blockade against such partisan behavior, with geographic allegiances superseding partisan ones. Not anymore. The partisan legislature is here to stay, and here to play.

Works Cited & Notes

¹ Hopkins, Daniel J. The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Political Behavior Nationalized. Chicago Studies in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018, pg. 19.

² Loomis, Burdett. “Kansas in a partisan era,” Topeka Capital-Journal, 2020.

³ Smith, Mitch. “Kansas Lawmakers Defect to Democrats as G.O.P. Struggles in Suburbs,” New York Times, 2019.

⁴ Masket, Seth, and Boris Shor. “Polarization without parties: Term limits and legislative partisanship in Nebraska’s Unicameral Legislature.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 15, no. 1 (2015): 67-90.

⁵ Pildes, Richard. “There’s Still a Loaded Weapon Lying Around in Our Election System”, New York Times, 2020.